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Unlike previous elections in the province, there was an expectance that the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) would retain control of the City of Cape Town, as well as consolidate in other 
municipalities in the Western Cape. In the run-up to the 2016 local government election, the 
ANC, in the Western Cape put on a brave face indicating that it could unseat the DA. 
However, the 2016 election in the Western Cape saw an entrenchment of the status quo. 
Indeed, the story of the 2016 Local Government Election in the Western Cape is the story of 
the DA’s ascent and the ANC’s decline in the province. The DA consolidated its support base in 
the City of Cape Town from a comfortable majority of 61 percent, in 2011, securing a two- 
thirds majority of 68 percent in 2016. In the rest of the Western Cape, the DA also 
consolidated its support base, winning in most municipalities with an outright majority and 
taking control of the balance through coalition agreements. The African National Congress 
(ANC), which had lost control of the city in 2006 when it was forced out of power through a 
DA-led coalition, saw its fortunes decline even further in 2016. The ANC no longer controls a 
single municipality in the Western Cape. This article examines electoral dynamics in the 
Western Cape, which saw the consolidation of DA support in the province. 
 
Introduction 
The Western Cape has always been a highly contested province (Africa, 2015). However, in this 
election, the province was not seen as the main story. In fact, there was such a strong sense 
that the DA would be the majority party in the province that the City of Cape Town was not 
included in the series of pre-election polls that were conducted by Ipsos in the run-up to the 
elections. In the past, political parties have seen the Western Cape as an “open race” and 
the province, typically, became the centre of vigorous campaign efforts and aggressive 
appeals to race-based fears in the lead-up to the elections (Africa, 2010). However, in 2016, 
campaign efforts were muted and less racialised because the DA felt comfortable enough to 
concentrate its efforts elsewhere in the country. In the end, this strategy bore fruit since the 
party managed to consolidate its power base in the Western Cape, winning a majority of 
municipalities, with an outright win, and increasing its hold on the City of Cape Town with a 
two-thirds majority. Irrespective of whether the changes that have occurred were due to 




As in previous elections, there was an increase in the number of political parties contesting 
in the province. This is possibly due to the fact that the Western Cape was previously seen as 
an “open race”. In the 2014 election, it was the most competitive province with 26 parties 
contesting at provincial level. As seen in Table 1 below, there has been a steady increase 
in the number of parties in every local election. In 2016, there was a high level of contestation 
again, with a record number of political parties at 77. There was also an increase in the 
number of candidates who stood for election. In the 2011 elections, there was a total of 7 105 
candidates (including party PR, party ward and independent candidates). This number 
increased to 7 869 in 2016. Several new parties competed for the first time in the Western 
Cape. Similarly, the Cape metropolitan council had the longest PR ballot paper with 37 parties 
competing for power (IEC, 2016). 
 
Registration Trends 
The number of registered voters in the Western Cape shows a steady increase since the 
2000 election. The total of registered voters increased from 1.9 million in 2000 to 2.3 
million in 2006 with up to 2.7 million in 2011. By election day, in 2016, there were 3.1 
million registered voters in the Western Cape. Likewise, the number of registered voters in the 
metro increased to 2.0 million. This has been to the advantage of the DA. According to Scholtz 
(2016), the DA has consistently been able to register a disproportionately high number of 
new voters in its strong areas, while new registrations have lagged in strong ANC areas. As 
Scholtz argues, “this is probably due to the DA’s much vaunted voter targeting and turnout 
operation in Cape Town, which is extremely effective at getting DA voters to the polls on 
registration weekends and election days” and that “over time, this creates an overall 
electorate that is much more heavily weighted in favour of the DA”. 
 
Turnout Trends 
Since 2000, turnout levels in the Western Cape have been consistently higher than turnout 
in South Africa. This trend remained consistent in the 2016 elections. On election day, 63.6 
percent of voters in the Western Cape and 64.3 percent in the Cape Metro cast their ballot 
compared to 58.1 percent nationally. Voter turnout in Cape Town rose from 1.1 million in 2011 









For example, 75.5 percent of registered voters cast their ballot in Prince Albert compared 
to 51.7 percent in Witzenberg. Likewise, in the Cape Metro there was significant variability 
in turnout at the ward level. The DA has benefi from high turnout in areas where it is well- 
supported, while there has been a decline in turnout in former ANC strongholds. 
 
Cape Metro Results 
The DA celebrated an improved performance at all levels. It got more than a two-thirds 
majority – 68 percent – a notable increase from 61.15 percent in 2011. In absolute numbers, 
the DA increased its total vote share from 1 357 949 in 2011 to 1 664 514 in 2016, which 
translates to 306 565 more votes than in the previous local election. Thus, the DA won 154 
seats out of 231 available in the metro. Conversely, the number of seats secured by the ANC 
declined from 73 in 2011 to 57 seats in 2016. In absolute numbers, the total number of valid 
votes cast for the ANC in the Cape Metro decreased from 731 247 in 2011 to 608 867 in 2016 – 






Municipal Results in the Western Cape 
Similarly, ANC support has declined in the Western Cape. From 1 156 352 in 2011, the total 
number of votes the party gained dropped to 1 004 354 in 2016. This amounted to a drop 
of 151 998 votes. The ANC received 40.15 percent of the vote in the 2006 elections. This 
dropped to 34.1 percent in 2011, further dropping to 25 percent in 2016. This amounts to 
a 25 percentage point drop between 2006 and 2016. At the same time, in absolute numbers, 
the DA increased its total valid vote share from 1 982 789 in 2011 to 2 425 371 in 2016. The 
DA secured 442 582 more votes. 
 
The ANC failed to win a majority in a single municipality in the Western Cape – it no longer 
controls any municipalities in the province. In contrast, the DA won outright majorities in 
the municipalities of Bergrivier, Breede Valley, Cape Agulhas, Cederberg, Drakenstein, 
George, Langeberg, Matzikama, Mossel Bay, Oudtshoorn, Overstrand, Saldanha Bay, 
Stellenbosch, Swartland, Swellendam and Theewaterskloof. The DA, therefore, did not need to 
enter into coalition partnerships in these councils. This is a continuation of trends that began 
in the 2011 election, namely the consolidation of the DA’s support base, contrasted with the 




There were eight municipalities that required coalitions. In these municipalities, a number 
of small, local parties held the balance of power. These parties were Witzenberg Aksie (WA), the 
Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA), the Active United Front (AUF), the 
Knysna Unity Congress (KUC), the Karoo Gemeenskap Party (KGP), the Karoo 
Ontwikkelings Party (KOP), and the Karoo Democratic Force (KDF) (Berkowitz, 2016b). 
 
For the fi time, the ANC lost Beaufort West, an area regarded as its stronghold under the 




since 2011: Cederberg, Matzikama, Cape Agulhas and the Central Karoo District 
Municipality. The DA concluded deals with the KGP, the KDF and the KOP to control the 
municipal councils in Prince Albert, Laingsburg and Beaufort West, as well as the greater 
Central Karoo District Municipality. Additionally, the DA concluded an agreement with an 
independent candidate to control Knysna and entered into a coalition with the Freedom Front 
Plus to rule Hessequa (Phakathi, 2016). In the Kannaland Municipality, which has a long 
history of controversial and collapsing coalitions, DA and ANC councillors worked together to 
vote out the Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA) which won almost 50 
percent of the vote (Evans, 2016a). 
 
Wards Results in the Western Cape 
The ANC’s poor performance at the provincial and metro levels reflects a similarly dismal 
showing at ward level. The DA won 81 of the 116 wards, while the ANC won only 35 wards 
(Berkowitz, 2016b). According to Berkowitz, a direct comparison between the 2011 and 2016 















Since a comparison is possible in Khayelitsha and Langa, Berkowitz’s analysis of turnout shows 
ANC losses and DA gains in those areas. As Kimmie (2012:129) indicates, “a party’s 
electoral performance depends both on turnout and, specifically, on the level of turnout 
among party supporters, and the electoral choices of those who choose to vote”. Berkowitz 
illustrates, in his analysis, that the decline in turnout in Khayelitsha and Langa was 
pronounced. In Khayelitsha, turnout fell from 74 percent in 2011 to 56 percent in 2016. The DA 
increased its share of the vote from 5 percent to 13 percent in Khayelitsha and from 3 
percent to 6 percent in Langa. The ANC lost a significant share of the vote in Langa and also 
went from over 109 000 votes in Khayelitsha to under 84 000 votes. Berkowitz argues that 
the ANC was hit by a combination of lower turnout, from its core base, and increased 
competition by the DA and other parties – in particular, the EFF. Although the EFF didn’t win 
more than 15 percent in any ward, it did best in ANC strongholds, and smaller parties such as the 
PAC and the African Independent Congress (AIC) also hurt the ANC with gains in and around 
Khayelitsha. 
 
The DA’s Ascent in the Western Cape 
The DA has steadily been increasing its support base in the Western Cape. Since 1999, 
the predecessor of the DA, the Democratic Party (DP), adopted an aggressive strategy. 
Under the leadership of Tony Leon, it built this strategy around “robust opposition”, with 
a focus on government failings, incompetence, corruption and a lack of urgency (Schrire, 
2001:142). At this point, the DP obtained 12 percent in the Western Cape. In 2004, the 
DA’s support base in the Western Cape climbed to 27.1 percent. In 2006, the DA attained 
plurality (42.7 percent of the vote and 90 out of 210 council seats) in the City of Cape Town. It 
managed to gain power in the metro through a “fragile six-party coalition, and then a more 
secure one later when joined by the Independent Democrats” (Jolobe, 2009:136). Helen 
Zille took over as the mayor of the City of Cape Town. This set the scene for the DA to win 
outright control of the Western Cape at provincial level in the 2009 elections. The DA ran its 
“One Nation One Future” campaign under the leadership of Helen Zille. Its message could be 
summarised by the slogans of two campaign posters: “Vote to win” and “Stop Zuma” 
(Daniel & Southall, 2009:237). Messages about the challenges to democracy posed by a Zuma-
led government and ANC dominance resonated with voters in the Western Cape and the DA 
received an outright majority, securing 51.4 percent of the provincial vote in the 2009 
provincial elections. 
 
The DA consolidated its Western Cape support base in the 2011 local government 
elections. The party received a boost when the Independent Democrats (ID), formed by 
Patricia de Lille of the Pan African Congress (PAC) was absorbed by the DA prior to the 2011 
local elections. Furthermore, Patricia de Lille was invited into the Western Cape DA 
provincial cabinet and was later elected as the DA mayor for the City of Cape Town 
(Jolobe, 2014:50). In the run-up to the 2014 elections, DA parliamentary leader, Lindiwe 
Mazibuko, and the DA’s Gauteng premier candidate, Musi Maimane, managed to achieve 
national profiles that enhanced the credibility of the DA. The Democratic Alliance 
emerged from the elections signifi    strengthened. The party increased its majority in the 





The growth of the DA has resulted in several benefits for the party. It has become more 
institutionalised. Mainwaring (1998), in his work on institutionalisations, contends that “it 
is a sign of greater system institutionalization if parties have fi established structures; if 
they are territorially comprehensive; if they are well organized; if they have clearly defined 
internal structures and procedures; and if they have resources of their own”. Next to the 
ANC, the DA has demonstrated significant growth, which extends beyond the support that it 
receives at the polls. According to Mainwaring, well-institutionalised parties “are not 
subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders, but possess an independent 
status and value of their own”. Whether or not the DA is “subordinated to the interests of a 
few ambitious leaders” is beyond the scope of this article. However, as it grew, the party has been 
able to extend its structures and, therefore, its organisational capacity. This enables the party 
to exert more influence as well as generate media interest. In fact, in 2015, the party was able 
to have its leadership election broadcast live on national television. 
 
Additional criteria identified by Mainwaring are active mass memberships, sizable and 
professionalised staff, as well as strong loyalty on the part of elected representatives. The 
DA may need to work on developing an active mass membership. However, it’s professional 
and well-choreographed election campaigns are indicative of a professionalised staff There 
is an expansion of prominent party leaders. The DA benefitted significantly from the 
absorption of Patricia de Lille and the ID into the DA. Patricia de Lille had a fairly substantial 
support base in the Western Cape and, despite the critiques that have been levelled against her, 
is seen as a widely credible leader. The election of Musi Maimane as Helen Zille’s successor 
has been seen as a significant asset for the Democratic Alliance. Certainly, the DA appears 
to be moving to a higher level of institutionalisation. 
 
The DA’s main challenge has been to shed an image of being a party concerned with “elite 
interests”. The DA has been acutely aware of this challenge and has made a concerted 
effort to stress that it is a party of inclusion. While the view that the DA has perpetuated 
inequality and apartheid-era spatial planning in the province persists, it did little to 
dampen the DA’s stamina in portraying itself as a competent alternative to the ANC. 
 
Of significance is the growing sense of loyalty to the DA among voters in the Western Cape. Data 
from Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 2008, 2011 and 2015 shows a dramatic swing in 
party identification away from the ANC and towards the DA. 
 
The data in Figure 1 on the following page shows an increase in party identification among 
voters in the Western Cape. Levels of party identific a t ion increased from 48 percent in 







In 2008, of the 48 percent who indicated that they felt close to a political party, 27 
percent said they felt close to the ANC and 34 percent said they felt close to the DA. At that 
stage, 22 percent declined to indicate which party they felt close to. In 2011, of the 61 
percent who indicated that they felt close to a political party, 49 percent said they felt close to 
the ANC and 45 percent said they felt close to the DA. By 2015, 79 percent of respondents in 
the Western Cape said that they felt close to a political party. Of this proportion, 37.6 percent 
said they felt close to the ANC, while 55.3 percent said they felt close to the DA. This indicates 
that the DA is starting to develop firm links in society in the Western Cape. This represents 
quite a dramatic swing in party identifi   ion. Once a voter indicates identifi ion with a political 
party, they tend to review political events and campaign information through the lens of that identifi 
ion. Campbell, Converse and Miller (1960:121-122) define party identification as “a 
psychological identifi ion which can persist without formal membership and even without a 
consistent record of party support”. They argue that “party identifi ion has a wide range of 
intensities in each partisan direction and that national politics are deeply affected by the 
individual’s enduring party attachments”. According to Campbell et al. (1960:133), 
“identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to 
see what is favourable to his partisan orientation”. 
 
While Afrobarometer data shows the swing in support from the ANC to the DA over a period 




voters who switched from the ACDP and COPE to the DA. She found that the primary 
motivation for the movement away from these parties was leadership and the party’s 
image. The respondents interviewed were drawn to what they saw as the DA’s strong 
leadership orientation. To these voters, the DA’s leadership and governing track record 
in the City of Cape Town created hope and inspiration. According to Moses, negative 
perceptions about the leadership of the ACDP and COPE were linked to the poor presence 
and visibility of the parties during the 2011 election. Participants felt that party leaders, 
candidates and campaigners should have been more visible in their communities. They 
indicated that positive engagement with the DA motivated them to change their vote to the 
DA in the 2011 election. The formation of COPE, in all likelihood, helped facilitate the 
movement of voters from the ANC to the DA, since those voters who abandoned the ANC to 
vote for COPE did not return to the ANC. 
 
The DA’s Campaign 
High visibility and eff ive campaigning remain important to South African voters. What 
makes for a good campaign? According to Africa (2009:20), “campaign messages are 
effective when the party weaves its messages together into a well-blended and internally 
consistent theme congruent with previous campaigns using comparative messages”. 
Additionally, campaign messages should be conveyed as widely as possible and through 
accessible and credible mechanisms. The DA fares well on all of these criteria. The DA used 
multiple channels to communicate its campaign messages and there was no significant 
departure from previous campaigns. 
 
The DA’s steady growth would have enabled more personalised campaigning in 2016. The 
DA ran a highly visible national campaign under the banner “Change that moves South 
Africa forward again” (DA, 2016). The party ran a series of television and radio 
advertisements. Television advertisements were also loaded on to YouTube. Their 
campaigning methods covered the full spectrum. This included political rallies, door-to-door 
volunteer work, posters and billboards. Rallies were held in Nelson Mandela Bay, 
Tshwane and Dobsonville Stadium in Soweto. This was in line with its strategy to win 
Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane while retaining Cape Town and reducing the ANC’s 
majority to below 50 percent in Johannesburg. Even though the DA chose to focus on the 
more contested metros in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng, it received significant media 
coverage of rallies and door-to-door events. The DA also made extensive use of SMSs and phone 
calls as well as social media platforms through Facebook and Twitter. DA posters urged voters 
to “honour Madiba’s dream”. Importantly, there has been congruence in the DA’s campaigns. As 
in previous elections, the DA urged voters to “Vote for Change”. The DA promised to: create 
more opportunities and jobs, make local government responsive, provide better service 
delivery, stop corruption and make communities safer. The DA message argued that its core 
values are freedom, fairness and opportunity. 
 
Congruent with previous campaigns, much of the DA’s strategy was focused on highlighting 
the shortfalls of the ANC while, simultaneously, highlighting the party’s achievements in 




on how the ANC had failed to fulfil former President Nelson Mandela’s legacy. When Maimane 
addressed DA supporters at Dobsonville Stadium on 30 July 2016, he said they shouldn’t 
worry because the DA was going to do it for Madiba (eNCA, 2016a). He made the following key 
points at its final rally. 
 
 The ANC has turned its back on everything Nelson Mandela fought for. 
 
 Under President Jacob Zuma, Chris Hani’s fears (liberators would emerge as elitists) 
have come true. 
 
 The time has come for a peaceful revolution in our country. 
 
 Where the DA governs, we have the lowest unemployment in South Africa. 
 
 A vote is not a tattoo that stays with you forever. 
 
Not only did the DA appeal to Nelson Mandela’s legacy, it brazenly flighted an advert, which 
used excerpts of Nelson Mandela’s recordings, calling for peace and justice. This caused quite 
an outcry, with the Mandela family releasing a statement accusing the DA of abusing the 
late statesman’s name (Eyewitness News, 2016b). 
 
As in previous elections, the DA has been able to use its incumbency in the City of Cape 
Town and in provincial government to its advantage. The DA continued using comparative 
messages highlighting its record of governance in the province and the City of Cape Town, 
while criticising the ANC nationally and in other provinces. The Western Cape has been used 
as a model for strategy to be used in other provinces, namely to gain control of the metro 
and use this as a base to take control of the province. The story of the Western Cape was 
used as the DA’s campaign theme. The DA’s strengthened position is a combination of greater 
institutionalisation, astute campaigning and voter frustration with the ANC. 
 
National Trends and Frustration with the ANC 
The story of the DA’s ascent in the Western Cape cannot be separated from the national 
context, which has seen the ANC face a myriad of complex challenges and fractious 
internal battles. The view that the ANC would be in for a tough election in the Western Cape 
clearly had merit. National events and struggles in the ANC, which has seen voters in the 
Western Cape turn to the DA, have not abated. The crises in the ANC, at national and 
provincial level, certainly helped the DA and continued to create a situation that adds 
credibility to the DA’s messages. In addition to the Western Cape ANC’s own problems, any 
headway that it could make has been overshadowed by the whirlwind of events occurring at 
national level. 
 
By their own admission, the ANC has been grappling with factionalism and division within 
its ranks. Most notably, there has been sustained controversy and a significant public uproar 




President Jacob Zuma’s private residence in Nkandla. On 31 March 2016, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that Zuma had failed to uphold the Constitution when he ignored the Public 
Protector’s recommendation to repay a portion of the funds used to upgrade his private 
residence in KwaZulu-Natal (News24, 2016). President Zuma issued a public apology for 
the “frustration and confusion” around Nkandla. In line with the Constitutional Court 
judgement, the National Treasury determined that President Zuma needed to pay R7.8 
million back to the state (Mail & Guardian, 2016a). 
 
On 29 April 2016, the High Court in Pretoria ruled that the former head of the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Mokotedi Mpshe’s 2009 decision to drop corruption charges 
against Zuma was irrational (Mail & Guardian, 2016b). This matter stems back more than a 
decade to the protracted and well-publicised corruption trial of Schabir Shaik. In 2005 
Shaik was found guilty and the basis of the conviction hinged on payments he had made to 
the then Deputy President, Jacob Zuma. 
 
Another disastrous series of events that damaged public perceptions of the ANC and 
President Zuma occurred in December 2015, when he removed the Finance Minister, 
Nhlanhla Nene, from his position and replaced him with David van Rooyen, provoking 
widespread criticism. Given the negative reaction of the markets, President Zuma was forced 
to reassign the newly appointed Finance Minister to another position, four days later, and 
appoint Pravin Ghordan as the new Finance Minister (Mail.& Guardian, 2015a). In a press 
statement, the deputy Finance Minister, Mcebisi Jonas, publicly stated that members of the 
Gupta family offered him the position of Minister of Finance to replace the then Minister, 
Nene (Mail & Guardian, 2016c). This was one of a series of damning revelations by ANC 
officials regarding the influence of the Gupta family. 
 
The controversies around President Zuma have caused significant damage to the ANC, 
causing severe divisions within the organisation. Notably, senior ANC members and past 
party leaders have also publicly criticised Zuma and have supported calls by civil society 
organisations and the opposition for his resignation. President Jacob Zuma remains at 
the centre of many of the challenges facing the ANC. Despite this, the ANC chose to retain 
President Zuma as the face of the ANC in their 2016 local government election campaign. 
 
In April 2016, there were significant protests relating to disputes about municipal 
boundaries following a failed court bid to compel the Municipal Demarcations Board to 
reverse its decision to merge certain municipalities. Scores of schools were either vandalised 
or completely torched during the protests (eNCA, 2016b). Shortly before the 2016 elections, 
violent protests erupted in Gauteng, following the announcement of Thoko Didiza as the 
ANC’s mayoral candidate for the party in Tshwane. ANC members took to the streets to 
express dissatisfaction with the nomination, burning buses and looting malls as well as other 
businesses (Nhlebela, 2016). 
 
A more extreme manifestation of factionalism and division was the killing of several 




to the local government elections. A task team was set up to investigate the rise in the 
number of political killings, which occurred primarily in KwaZulu-Natal. Indeed, Police 
Minister, Nathi Nhleko, noted “with serious concern, the incidents of killings, particularly 
where political figures are victims or where the killings are being linked to the upcoming 
local government elections” (Gqirana, 2016b). 
 
Already, in the run-up to the 2014 elections, the ANC had increased condemnation from its own 
supporters and, indeed, former party leaders. So much so that Ronnie Kasrils, among others, 
embarked on the Sidikiwe, Vukane, “We are fed up” campaign, to either spoil one’s vote or vote 
for a small party. The party also faced criticism from the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) for the rollout of highway tolling fees in Gauteng, as well as sections of 
the National Development Plan. The National Union of Metalworkers of SA (NUMSA) 
strongly criticised the ANC and President Zuma, and decided not to endorse the ruling party 
in the 2014 election (Africa, 2014). This followed the significant criticism it faced after events 
such as the televised death of community activist, Andries Tatane, in 2011 at the hands of 
police in the Free State, and the lethal use of force where 34 Lonmin mineworkers were shot 
and killed by police officers, in August 2012, in what has become known as the “Marikana 
Massacre”. At that time, civil society organisation, Right2Know, also led a highly visible 
campaign against the so-called “secrecy bill”, while rights organisation, Section 27, 
highlighted inefficiencies in the public school system, particularly around the non-delivery of 
textbooks in Limpopo (Africa, 2014). 
 
Of course, one of the most defi moments was the ANC elective conference in Polokwane in 
2007. As Booysen (2009:90) indicates, the ANC “entered a spiral of contestation between 
Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, centring on issues of succession and incumbency” and 
culminating in the removal of Thabo Mbeki as president of the country. In September 2008, 
just more than six months before the 2009 general elections, Judge Chris Nicholson 
delivered a high court judgement that inferred that Mbeki and senior members of his Cabinet had 
interfered with the work of the NPA in regard to the decision to prosecute Zuma (Jolobe, 
2009:139). The judgement provided the basis for a vote of no confidence in Mbeki. Following 
Mbeki’s televised resignation, ANC deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe became South 
Africa’s acting president. These events also lead to the resignation of several ANC members, 
and the Congress of the People was formed under the leadership of Mosiuoa Lekota and 
Mbhazima Shilowa. As Butler (2009:69) points out, the unprecedented defeat of an 
incumbent ANC president was followed by a wave of instability during which officeholders 
were “recalled” and perceived Mbeki-loyalists  purged. 
 
While these events occurred at national level, there is no doubt that they influenced the 
perceptions of voters in the Western Cape. These national political developments had a very 
damaging effect on perceptions of President Zuma and the ANC among voters in the 
Western Cape. An Afrobarometer survey conducted in late 2008 revealed that only 13 
percent of respondents in the province said they trusted Zuma “always” or “most of the time” 
(Africa, 2010:19). By 2016, these sentiments had hardened with a substantial majority of 




indicating that President Zuma should resign both as the leader of the ANC and as the 
president of South Africa. According to the surveys, the sentiment was strongest in the 
Western Cape with over three-quarters of respondents saying that President Zuma should step 
down, both as president of South Africa and as leader of the ruling party. Indeed, there has 
been a signifi critique against the national leadership of the ANC for not taking public sentiment 
against President Zuma to heart. 
 
The latest Afrobarometer survey also revealed a sharp decline in public distrust of President 
Zuma. (Lekalake, 2015). Given these deep-seated negative perceptions of President Zuma 
and the ANC, it is hard to see how any campaigning would persuade South Africans to vote 
for them. According to Newman and Perloff (2004:27), “persuasion experts 
unquestionably agree that the source of a message can significantly influence political 
attitudes”. Indeed, the literature reveals that, in most situations, people accept or reject 
persuasive messages based on their evaluation of the credibility of the source of the 
message (Milburn, 1991; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000; Iyengar & Valentino, 2000; Popkin 
& Dimock, 2000; Newman & Perloff, 2004). Lupia and McCubbins (2000:48) assert that 
“without trust there is no persuasion ...”. 
 
Perceptions of campaign leaders are also important because, in many instances, 
campaigns centre on the style and personalities of party leaders. Character traits (such as 
competence, warmth, activity, strength, integrity, honesty and empathy) of leaders are 










The logical extension of these arguments is that voters will be less likely to pay attention to 
campaign messages coming from a party or leader they see as being incompetent or 
untrustworthy. Negative perceptions of parties and leaders can lead voters to question 
the content of campaign messages, rendering the most compelling campaign strategies 
ineffective. Thus, campaigning is of little worth if the recipients of the campaign see the 
messages as “tainted” by the characteristics of the source of the message. Messages from an 
untrustworthy source will either be interpreted through a negative mental schema or simply 
ignored. On the other hand, voters are more likely to engage with campaign messages if they 
trust the political party and/or leader issuing the message. 
 
The ANC in the Western Cape 
Even if the ANC in the Western Cape had well-functioning structures and ran an eff ive 
campaign, it would, in all likelihood, still have been overshadowed by national events 
and the negative perceptions emanating from those events. In any event, ANC structures 
in the Western Cape have also been beset with problems. The party’s leadership in the 
Western Cape seems to have been operating in crisis mode for several years now. Leading 
up to the 2016 local elections, the problems in the Western Cape were so severe that the 
party’s national structures had to intervene and place the provincial structures under 
administration (Mtyala, 2016). 
 
In November 2015, the party’s provincial secretary, Faiz Jacobs, was accused of assaulting 
a staff researcher. The ANC’s provincial executive committee placed Jacobs on 




internal disciplinary committee, which found Jacobs guilty of assault. Jacobs received 
an 18-month suspension, which was suspended for three years on condition that he does 
not commit a similar offence (Meyer, 2016). The Western Cape chairperson of the ANC, 
Marius Fransman, has also been mired in controversy. He was re-elected, unopposed, as 
provincial chairperson after he threatened to pull out during nominations, because of 
internal power struggles (Daily Maverick, 2016). In January 2016, Fransman was accused 
of sexual harassment. Fransman denied the sexual harassment charge and claimed he was 
a victim of an “organised and engineered” campaign to discredit him by rival factions in the 
Western Cape ANC (Daily Maverick, 2016). Following the incident, Fransman was asked to 
step aside while the police and the ANC’s integrity committee investigate the sexual 
harassment allegations made against him. The ANC’s national executive committee was 
forced to intervene in the party’s Western Cape leadership by appointing caretakers to 
fill the breach left by provincial chairperson, Marius Fransman, and secretary, Faiz Jacobs. 
 
While ANC heavyweights Jacob Zuma, Cyril Ramaphosa, Jessie Duarte and Gwede 
Mantashe did campaign in the Western Cape, most campaigning was done by Cape 
Town ANC mayoral candidate, Xolani Sotashe. In June 2016, Fransman made an 
unexpected appearance in Philippi, Khayelitsha and Delft (in Cape Town), for the ANC’s 
door-to-door campaign, alongside President Jacob Zuma and other ANC leaders (Gqirana, 
2016). This caused confusion and tension within the party structures. It was reported that 
Nomvula Mokonyane, a member of the party’s national executive committee (NEC) who 
accompanied Zuma and Fransman on the campaign trail, told the media that 
Fransman had been reinstated. However, Jacobs informed the media that the provincial 
leadership of the party had received no formal news of Fransman’s reappointment as 
provincial leader (Gerber, 2016). ANC Secretary General, Gwede Mantashe, also insisted 
that Fransman had not been reinstated and that Mokonyane had been under pressure when 
she made the announcement. Fransman, on the other hand, maintained that he had a 
meeting with the provincial officials, before the campaign trail (in Cape Town), where they 
publically welcomed him back (Mail & Guardian, 2016). 
 
Consequently, the internal battles led to the cancellation of the ANC’s Western Cape 
Manifesto launch at the last minute. ANC Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, was meant 
to launch the manifesto in Khayelitsha, Cape Town in June. Jabu Mfusi, Western 
Cape’s provincial executive committee spokesperson, said that the cancellation was a result of 
“internal protesting from dissatisfied members within the party” (Pillay, 2016). Earlier 
this year, the ANC, in the province, also had to cancel its provincial 8 January 
celebrations in Grabouw, where Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa was due to share a 
microphone with leader Marius Fransman. The ANC also faced problems in Beaufort West 
with its mayor, Truman Prince, at the centre of a series of controversies including assault 
charges and allegations of influencing tender processes (Eyewitness News, 2016a). ANC 
Secretary General, Gwede Mantashe, called for an investigation. The ANC’s disciplinary 
committee of the Central Karoo region sentenced Prince to a R10 000 fine and a public 





As in previous elections, the ANC in the Western Cape experienced challenges in its 
candidate selection process. In fact, the Western Cape ANC suspended a member for 
allegedly instigating violent protests following the change of councillor candidates 
without residents’ consent (Evans, 2016b). The 2014 list process also presented significant 
challenges to the ANC in the Western Cape. The final list included Mbulelo Ncedana and 
Moegamat Majiet – both of whom left the ANC to join COPE when it was formed (Hartley, 
2014). Dissatisfaction with the list process was already evident in 2011 when ANC offices in 
Cape Town were stormed as a result of anger with the list process (Independent Online, 2013). 
In fact, the former ANC Deputy President, Kgalema Motlanthe, admitted that internal 
upheavals in the ANC caused the party to lose 40 wards in the Western Cape (Mtyala, 2011). 
The fallout from the 2011 elections continued well after the elections were concluded. An 
internal ANC task team, investigating allegations of irregularities in the list process, 
looked at 10 wards in Cape Town and three in the Overberg, and found that the processes 
leading to the nominations of Mzwakhe Nqavashe from ward 40 and Coetzee Ntotoviyane 
from ward 42, both in Gugulethu, had been flawed, and recommended that the party 
begin the processes afresh (Coetzee, 2014). 
 
In another incident, Western Cape ANC provincial chairperson Marius Fransman had to 
be rescued, by his bodyguards, from an attack in Oudtshoorn following a meeting to replace the 
town’s mayor, Gordon April (Barnes, 2013). 
 
The events outlined above did not spring from nowhere. Even before the formation of 
COPE in 2008, there were reports about the internal battles between factions aligned to former 
premier, Ebrahim Rasool, and the then provincial secretary, Mcebisi Skwatsha (News24, 
2005). Months after former president Mbeki was recalled as president of the country, 
Rasool was told to resign as premier and was replaced by the then fi MEC, Lynne Brown 
(Makinana & Williams, 2008). It is worth remembering that in 1999 and 2004, the ANC ran 
largely positive campaigns. In 2004, it focused on celebrating ten years of democracy by 
emphasising its achievements, acknowledging its shortcomings and drawing attention 
to its strength, experience and commitment. The ANC won 45.3 percent of the vote in 
2004 and took control of the provincial government in the Western Cape under the 
premiership of Ebrahim Rasool. After the DA seized control from the ANC in the 2009 
elections, governance in the province assumed a highly conflictual nature. Relations between 
the DA and the ANC in the Western Cape reached new levels of dysfunctional competitiveness. 
Besides policy differences and the usual vigour with which incumbent and opposition parties 
engage each other, a toxic level of acrimony and hostility has permeated exchanges between the 
two parties. This has cast the ANC in the Western Cape into a non-flattering role. Once it 
was ousted from power, the party became far more confrontational in its approach. 
 
Entrenchment of the Status Quo in the Western Cape 
Given the events outlined above, the entrenchment of the status quo in the Western Cape and 
the consolidation of DA support in the province should not be seen as a surprise. In 
addition to the Western Cape ANC’s own problems, any headway that it could make has 




ANC in the Western Cape had well-functioning structures and ran an effective campaign, 
it would, in all likelihood, still have been overshadowed by national events and the negative 
perceptions emanating from those events. At the same time, the DA has consistently been 
able to register a disproportionately high number of new voters in its strong areas and the DA 
has benefitted from high turnout in areas where it is well-supported, while there has been a 
decline in turnout in former ANC strongholds. Of significance is the growing sense of loyalty 
to the DA among voters in the Western Cape. The DA’s strengthened position is a 
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